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Supernaturalism became the philosophical assumption of Christian the-
ology during the thirteenth century A.O. The term supernatural was specifi-
cally developed and widely used by Thomas Aquinas and the Scholastics as 
a technical term to describe God as eternally, self-subsistent and hence dif-
ferent in essence from the created, natural order. The term lost its technical 
meaning as it was more generally used outside the classroom and it eventu-
ally became more popularly understood to designate something as beyond 
the normal.1 Because of this secondary meaning, some prefer to use the 
term supra-natural instead of super-natural since supra more precisely con-
veys the original, technical meaning of "above."2 
The Latin term supernaturalis first appeared in the ninth century. John 
Scotus Erigena used it in his translation of the works of pseudo-Dionysius 
from Greek into Latin. He coined this Latin term as a translation for the 
Greek adjective huperphues. The prefix huper (beyond) was used in inference 
to phusis (the nature or essence of reality) to denote something as transcend-
ing the ordinary, visible world.3 Thomas Aquinas featured this term promi-
nently and is largely responsible for its widespread technical use in Chris-
tian theology.4 
If Augustine is credited with providing the standardization of the vari-
ous Christian doctrines for Western Christianity in the fourth century A.o.,5 
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Aquinas in the thirteenth century A.O. is credited with providing a Christian 
metaphysical framework for these doctrines.6 1his distinction between the 
various doctrines of Christian faith on the one hand, and a systematic 
worldview on the other hand, is important to keep in mind because the two 
are not necessarily connected. As Etienne Gilson points out, Thomas Aqui-
nas never intended to alter the essentials of Christian theology itself as inter-
preted by Augustine, but he did intend to change the "bad" philosophy of 
Augustine into a "true" philosophy consistent with Augustine's own theol-
ogy. In fact, Gilson shows that for Aquinas "it is not even necessary for the-
ology to resort to philosophy, but, if it does, the philosophy it uses should 
be the true philosophy."7 
Aquinas accepted Augustinian theology, but he disagreed with its 
largely Platonic trappings. Consequently, he adapted Augustinian theology 
to an Aristotelian ontology.8 The distinction between the natural and the 
supernatural worlds became the fundamental categories for describing the 
relation of God and the world. The purpose of this supernaturalism was to 
provide a more philosophically reasoned worldview in which all the doc-
trines of the Christian faith could be housed and thus they would have an 
intellectual unity supporting them. 
The term supernatural is not found in the Septuagint, nor in the New 
Testament, nor in the early Church Fathers.9 Yet the term is standard cur-
rency in Roman Catholic, Anglican and Protestant theology. Even those the-
ologies which reject supernaturalism depend upon its terminology for ex-
pressing its alternative forms of Christian naturalism. For example, Paul Til-
lich's theology was devoted to providing "ecstatic naturalism" as an alterna-
tive to the supernaturalism of Protestant Orthodoxy.10 In his last public lec-
ture in Chicago, Tillich admitted that his own apologetic theology was too 
heavily dominated by his attempt to provide an alternative theology to su-
pranaturalism.11 It could be argued that all modem and contemporary theo-
logical movements are unintelligible without the supernaturalism which 
they attempt to refute or embrace.12 
THE FAILURE OF SUPERNATURALISM 
The question is whether or not supernaturalism should now be aban-
doned in spite of its venerable history. Until recently, the two basic models 
for defining God's whereabouts have been "above" or "within." The 
"above" model led to supranaturalistic deism and finally to a secularistic 
naturalism which dropped "the aboveness" of God and spiritual realities al-
together since the world "below" was allegedly adequate within itself. The 
supernatural hypothesis was declared irrelevant for modem thought. 
Paul Tillich's critique largely focused on the artificiality of, as well as the 
logical incoherence, of two separate realms. To postulate the idea of a God 
above the world who interferes with, and breaks into, the lower realm below 
would involve the demonic destruction of the created order itself.13 His al-
ternative proposal was a naturalism in which God is located "within" the 
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world as the ground of being. 
The "within" model leads inevitably to pantheistic mysticism in which 
the distinction between God and the world is blurred. Since Schleiermacher, 
all forms of modem theology which reject supernaturalism in favor of natu-
ralism have been hard-pressed to defend themselves against the charge of 
blurring the difference between God and creation. 
Barth attempted to rehabilitate supernaturalism, but his tendency was to 
make God "permanently transcending time,"U and hence rationally inacces-
sible. The further dilemma of Barth's supernaturalism was its excessive 
revelationism, and consequently the relation of reason and faith was seri-
ously damaged. In effect, Barth conceded the point of the atheistic critique 
(expressed by Feuerbach and Nietzsche) which had declared the world de-
void of any rational justification for belief in God. Pannenberg asks: 
But is Feuerbach really overcome in this way? Is it not instead 
merely a case of withdrawing from controversy with Feuerbach and 
his disciples if theology, unperturbed, begins to speak about God as 
if nothing had happened; without establishing any basis, or offering 
any justification for this concept except by referring to the fact that 
Christian preaching about God actually goes on? Is that not 
senseless renunciation of all critical discussion, and thus an act of 
spiritual capitulation to Feuerbach?15 
Pannenberg recognizes the value of taking seriously the critique of mod-
em atheism. Barth's approach of pursuing theology "from above" is like "a 
blind alley" and endangers "the truth of the Christian faith itself and its 
speech about God."16 What is now needed is "a philosophical anthropology 
worked out within the framework of a general ontology" in order to address 
the legitimate concerns of secularistic naturalism.17 
An Anglo-Catholic theologian/philosopher who impressively at-
tempted to rehabilitate supernaturalism is E. L. Mascall. His brilliant exposi-
tion of the classical doctrine of God is found in He Who ls. Yet Mascall ad-
mits that the tendency of the supernatural/ natural distinction is to make the 
two realms only artificially related. He specifically recognizes that "imagery 
of levels .. .is quite inadequate, for it fails to do justice to the intimacy of the 
relation" between the supernatural and natural. He especially criticizes the 
Catholic textbooks for fostering this misunderstanding.18 
With the help of all the intricacies and sophistication of modem sym-
bolic logic, many contemporary analytical philosophers in the Anglo-Ameri-
can tradition have impressively attempted to resolve the ambiguities and al-
leged contradictions of the traditional, supernatural view of a personal 
God.19 However, whether or not the logical tools of analytical philosophy 
can repair the damage done by the atheistic critique is problematic. It may 
be that the atheistic critique too simplistically dismisses and distorts a super-
natural view of God, but the complicated arguments of modem logic used to 
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defend supernaturalism may indirectly serve to reinforce the atheistic 
charge that belief in a personal God is only contrived. 
The supernatural/ natural ontology is a hierarchical/ monarchical/ feu-
dalistic model. Even before Thomas Aquinas featured supernaturalism, clas-
sical theology tended toward Monarchianism in spite of its rejection of this 
heresy.20 For example, Augustine clearly articulated the three persons of 
God, but for all practical purposes he (as well as the Western Church in gen-
eral, as opposed to the Eastern Orthodox tradition) tended toward Mon-
archianism because his primary interest was the unity of God rather than 
the three divine persons.21 
With the subsequent development of a supernatural ontology in Latin 
Scholasticism, the oneness of God became even more specifically interpreted 
in a hierarchical/ monarchical/ feudalistic manner. For God's oneness as a 
feudalistic lord over His subjects was featured rather than the Three Per-
sons. Yet, even so, theology in the Middle Ages did not define God as a per-
son. That would have been considered what we call today a Unitarian her-
esy.22 
Yet this monarchical tendency to exclude the trinitarian persons resulted 
in the heretical, modern redefinition of God as a Person rather than three 
Persons. Tillich points out that this happened /1 only in the nineteenth cen-
tury" with Kant's deistic supernaturalism.23 In this respect, Pannenberg 
points out that in Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant's redefinition of person 
as an independent being with a radically individualized self-consciousness 
became determinative for the modern understanding of person. This abso-
lute understanding of person is anticipated in the fourth century A.D. in 
Boethius' s definition of person as rational individuality, but with Kant the 
ideas of self-consciousness and autonomy became the constitutive element 
in the meaning of person. 24 
The pre-modem view, on the other hand, assumed that the decisive 
component of person was one's capacity to experience community and to 
develop intimate relationships with others. This relational understanding of 
person was decisive for the theological development of a Christian under-
standing of God as three Persons in the fourth and fifth centuries. 
As a result of the absolutizing of individual self-consciousness as the 
meaning of person in the modern world, Tillich says that /1 ordinary theism 
has made God a heavenly, completely perfect person who resides above the 
world and mankind." Tillich agrees with /1 the protest of atheism against 
such a highest person."25 
Pannenberg has traced the development and rise of the modern under-
standing of personhood from the christological and trinitarian doctrines of 
the third and fourth centuries to its culmination in Hegel's philosophy.26 Of 
course, the ultimate source lies in the history of ancient Israel where God 
discloses Himself to Abraham as the personal Lord of history.27 The Old 
Testament idea of God's spiritual transcendence and difference from nature 
was a necessary prerequisite for the development of the understanding of 
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human self-transcendence associated with the meaning of personhood in 
the modem world, as secularist philosophers and psychologists generally 
recognize.28 
Pannenberg has shown how modem atheism in the nineteenth century 
developed as the logical conclusion of Kant's definition of personhood as 
absolute subjectivity. In this respect, Kant, not Descartes, was the father of 
modem subjectivity. For Kant was the first thinker to make individual self-
consciousness not only the basis of our certainty of knowledge (as Descartes 
had done), but also the actual creator and source of the world which we 
know.29 Kant's deistic supernaturalism allowed for both God and humans to 
be autonomous persons and creators. Instead of a relational understanding 
of persons as classically expressed in the doctrine of the Trinity, Kant intro-
duced a new element into the concept of personhood which made self-con-
sciousness the absolute basis of reality itself. The consequence was that the 
practical Monarchianism of Western theology became actual Monarchian-
ism in the deistic supernaturalism of Kant's concept of God. God was now 
defined as an infinite Person. 
Hegel continued and deepened this new idea of God as the Supreme 
Person, and he more specifically replaced the classical terminology of one 
divine substance with one divine subject.30 God is the Absolute Subject, but 
whereas Kant deistically polarized God and the world, Hegel attempted to 
reconcile God and the world through his philosophy of history. Unlike 
Kant, Hegel would not accept the idea of a lifeless Supreme Being who 
dwells outside the sphere of the world. For Hegel, those modem theologi-
ans who accused Spinoza of atheism because he did not believe in a Su-
preme Being had embraced a worse kind of atheism because they affirmed 
the existence of the Supreme Being but denied that human beings could 
really know Him. Hegel rejected Spinoza's pantheism also, and he did so 
precisely because Spinoza's concept of the divine substance did not include 
the idea of God as "the absolute Person ... which constitutes the content of re-
ligious consciousness in Christianity," as Hegel pointedly says.31 Hegel's 
emphasis, then, was that God is a personal Subject, not an impersonal Sub-
stance. 
Hegel also sought to include the Trinity within his doctrine of God's 
personality. So Hegel combined the absolute and the relational understand-
ing of personhood. This culmination of the modem development of person-
hood in Hegel's philosophy is a legitimate extension of the Christian doc-
trine of the Trinity,32 but its primary application to the unity of God instead 
of His Trinity is where the difficulty lies.33 
Moltmann has shown that Barth's concept of God as the divine Subject, 
as opposed to Tertullian' s definition of God as divine Substance, is largely 
borrowed from Hegel's modem redefinition of God as Absolute Personal-
ity. 34 Pannenberg has also shown that Barth's idea of God's revelation as a 
self-revelation is borrowed from Hegel's philosophy of religion where this 
idea first appeared.35Previously, revelation had been largely defined tradi-
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tionally as propositions and information contained in the Bible. 
Though an abstract monotheism which culminates in the idea of God as 
a personal Subject can be traced back to the monarchical tendencies of West-
ern theology, deistic supranaturalism was the penultimate culmination of 
this trend, with modem atheism as the final product. Barth's theology re-
stored an emphasis upon the doctrine of the Trinity, but he so strongly em-
phasized the oneness of God's being that his otherwise proper restoration of 
the Trinity to its rightful place in theology was undermined. This can be 
seen in the way that Barth preferred to speak of God's oneness as a Person 
and to downgrade the Trinity impersonally as modes of being. Moltmann 
calls Barth's abstract monotheism "a late triumph for the Sabellian modal-
ism, which the early church condemned."36 
To summarize, classical theology since Tertullian had defined God' s 
unity as a substance, not as a person. The concept of person was reserved 
for the three persons of God. Yet, the subsequent development of Western 
theology tended, for all practical purposes, to treat the oneness of God con-
cretely as "person" instead of the Trinity as persons. With the rise of Kant's 
rationalistic philosophy of religion, God was specifically defined as a super-
mundane Person. How to reconstruct this supematuralistic, monarchical 
interpretation has been the preoccupation of modem theology from 
Schleiermacher to Barth. 
MODERN ATHEISM AS THE LEFT-OVER REMAINS OF 
SUPERNATURALISM 
The atheistic critique by the left-wing Hegelian, Ludwig Feuerbach 
(1804-1872), focuses upon the arbitrariness of a God who alone possesses all 
the qualities which humans desire but are destined to do without. Beginning 
with Kant's and Hegel's new definition of personhood as the creative, au-
tonomous self, Feuerbach' s projection theory explained that human beings 
created God in their own image rather than God creating human beings in 
His own image. He especially attacked Lutheranism because it pits God as 
" the highest being" against the natural world as if God dwells above us in a 
supernatural world with an air of superiority, while human beings are to-
tally bereft of any goodness or worth. Supposedly our only hope for a 
meaningful life comes as a gift when this angry God is appeased. This con-
descending attitude of a supernatural God whose superiority places Him 
above us destroys the foundation of human happiness, according to Feuer-
bach.37 
Previous to Feuerbach, modem atheism was merely an unproven asser-
tion which grew out of the development of modem natural science and its 
mechanistic picture of the world, as seen in eighteenth-century France. For 
example, Laplace developed a mechanistic system of finite causes which 
were said to be self-sufficient. The mechanistic worldview of classical phys-
ics discarded the idea of a creator and, as such, the supernatural world was 
eliminated. Now, with Feuerbach's critique, modem atheism was provided 
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with its rationale.38 
A further critique of secularistic naturalism, first advanced by Fichte 
(1762-1814) and subsequently reinforced by Feuerbach, was that the idea of 
a God above the world means God is simply another Person who co-exists 
alongside (or above) us.39 If God is a Person who co-exists with us, then He 
is necessarily finite, which is a contradiction to the doctrine of divine perfec-
tion-for personhood means having a specific self<onsciousness, and what-
ever is spedfically present is necessarily finite and limited. 
A further criticism proposed by secularistic naturalism is that the idea of 
a supernatural Person who co-exists above us in another world would mean 
the elimination of human freedom. If God is the present reality and meaning 
of our world, then we are not free to decide what we will make of our lives. 
If God's being is the goal of human destiny and He is totally present in this 
moment as the one who co-exists above us, then there is no room for human 
action based on free choice, since God is totally present as the one who has 
already actualized all potentiality of being.40 In order for human freedom to 
exist, the future must be a decisive component of reality, but the supematu-
ralistic model makes the "present" the essence of reality, and God is thus 
defined as the Timeless, Eternal Now. 
Pannenberg takes seriously the critique of modem atheism. He believes 
it would be "premature" simply to dismiss modem atheism as "hatred of 
God."'1 Its criticisms are acute and must be addressed thoughtfully. In fact, 
Pannenberg is in agreement with the substantive arguments of secularistic 
naturalism. He admits, /1 A being presently at hand, and equipped with om-
nipotence, would destroy such freedom by virtue of his overpowering 
might."'2 
The way out of modem atheism is not "to retreat into a supranaturalistic 
wildlife sanctuary,"63 as Barthian theology does with its divorce between 
faith and reason. Pannenberg sees Barth's theological subjectivism to be a 
surrender to the nihilism of Nietzsche (1844-1900). 
Modem atheism must be understood as the outcome of the rise of hu-
man subjectivity as the criterion of truth, as developed in the philosophy of 
Descartes (1596-1650):" Finally, the atheistic outcome is due to the idea of a 
supematuralistic Absolute Subject (Person) who coexists /1 above" us. The 
atheistic critique of Fichte, Feuerbach and Nietzsche is based on this concept 
of a supramundane Person.45 
Secularistic naturalism refuted the idea of this supematuralistic Subject 
(a divine Person) and replaced it with the autonomous subject (a human 
being). Not God but humans choose what is the truth! This atheistic self-af-
firmation is the inevitable consequence of a metaphysic of the will which 
Barth's subjectivism presupposes.46 
Actually, it is not the subjectivism of Descartes' rationalism and Locke's 
empiricism, or the deistic supernaturalism of Kant, which can be blamed for 
the rise of modem atheism. The seeds were sown in Medieval scholastic the-
ology with the development of a contrived compartmentalization of God 
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above the world who superimposed His will upon the world below. Pan-
nenberg writes: "It is just supranaturalistic thought which turns out in the 
last analysis to have already presupposed Nietzsche's grounding of the 
truth upon the will."47 
"The only way to overcome" modem atheism, Pannenberg observes, "is 
by means of a more radical inquiry into being."" "For theology, this means 
that its concept of God must be thought out in connection with the philo-
sophical question about being if it is to be a match for the atheism of 
Nietzsche."'9 
THE IMPASSE OF THE GREEK AND BIBLICAL IDEAS OF TRUTH 
Pannenberg shows that classical theology defined God's being primarily 
in terms of one who is eternally present at hand, a self-contained Being 
alongside other beings.50 This concept of a transcendent Being was devel-
oped from Greek philosophy with its emphasis that true being is hidden be-
hind the flux of sense-appearances. For the Greeks, true being is that which 
has no beginning and no end and is not affected by the flux of time and his-
tory. This unchanging truth of true being is not subject to the contingent 
events of sense-appearances, and thus true being guarantees the unity of 
truth and the dependability of the world.51 True being is thus timeless and 
without a history, according to Greek thought. 
Pannenberg points out that it is understandable that Christian theology 
combined the true being of Greek thought with the God of the Bible. God is 
absolutely unchanging and reliable because He is the all-embracing truth. 
Yet there are significant differences between the Greek philosophy of true 
being and the biblical view of God. 
First of all, the "Greek dualism between true being and changing sense-
appearances is superseded in the biblical understanding of truth. Here, true 
being is thought of not as timeless but instead as historical, and it proves its 
stability through a history whose future is always open." God is known as 
the all-embracing truth because of the "trustful self-surrender of faith" to 
God who has disclosed Himself in the contingent events of history.52 
Another distinction in the biblical view is that God is personal, in con-
trast to the Greek idea of true being which is an abstract principle. Further, 
the Greek understanding assumes that truth is universally accessible to rea-
son, whereas in the Hebrew understanding the unity and dependability of 
truth is experienced as one trusts in God's faithfulness as He has revealed 
Himself in the contingent events of their history. 
It was not until modem times that the impasse between the Greek con-
cept of truth as timelessness and the biblical understanding of truth as his-
toric was recognized as a serious problem.53 The rise of historical thinking in 
the modem world is the outgrowth of the growing consciousness of the ten-
sion between these two understandings. Pannenberg has shown how the 
idea of truth in the West started with the Greek concept of the timelessness 
of truth which is fully and universally accessible to human reason. Accord-
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ingly, cultural and historical differences are presumably irrelevant to the 
makeup of truth. With the rise of the modem historical consciousness 
(which is itself the outgrowth of a biblical understanding of reality), the 
Greek concept of a timeless truth existing independently in its own right 
was called into question and refuted by secularistic thought. 
The irony is that the penetrating critique developed by modem, atheistic 
secularism is largely indebted to the biblical understanding of reality as his-
tory instead of the Greek understanding of truth as a rational penetration 
into the nature of true being. For example, modem atheism called into ques-
tion the reality of a supramundane Being who lives in a timeless reahn of 
perfection on the grounds that truth-claims are made from the standpoint of 
our historically-conditioned situation. One is not able to simply leap out of 
this world rationalistically or through suprahistoric revelation and make 
truth-claims which are not historically and culturally conditioned. Truth is 
not a matter of timeless, static propositions. 
Equally ironic is that the idea of a supramundane Being who stands 
above or behind the world as the eternally present reality is derived from 
the Greek idea of true being and timelessness rather than from the biblical 
understanding of God as the Lord of history and the power of the un-
bounded future, whereas the atheistic insight that all truth is historically 
conditioned and contingent is ultimately derived from a biblical under-
standing of God who made Himself known through the contingent events 
of history. 
Both the Greek and Hebrew ideas of truth have determined the under-
standing of truth in the West until the present day.54 For the Greeks, truth is 
something that lies under or behind things and is discovered by rational 
probing into their interior depths. For the Hebrews, Hans von Soden has 
shown that "reality is regarded as history" and "truth is that which will 
show itself in the future."55 Ernst Cassirer has also demonstrated that the 
rise of the modem historical consciousness is the product of Christian faith 
itself.56 The irony is that secularistic naturalism has used the biblical insight 
concerning the historicality of truth to criticize and refute the Greek-inspired 
doctrine of supernaturalism. 
Pannenberg points out that the Greek understanding prevailed until the 
modem world, and since the Romantic movement and the rise of the mod-
em historical consciousness the biblical understanding of truth as history 
has been featured. It is no longer possible "rationalistically to separate the 
truth from its historically diverse forms."57 Reason and history together 
form the essence of truth. So the dilemma of the Greek and biblical under-
standing of truth has been highlighted in the modem world with the conse-
quence that the biblical perspective has become more determinative than in 
the pre-modem world. What is true emerges out of our personal and social 
relationships and is thus conditioned through the events of our history. 
This personal/ relational aspect of truth as conditioned by history was 
exaggerated in the subjectivism of Nietzsche, but it demonstrates that the 
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biblical motif of history and its emphasis on the personal character of reality 
has prevailed in the modern world.58 This shows that modern atheism has 
used the insights of the biblical understanding of the decisiveness of histori-
cally conditioned events as a basis for critiquing and refuting classical theol-
ogy's Greek-derived view of God as a supramundane Being. 
Pannenberg has shown that the significance of Hegel's philosophy was 
his penetrating insight into the historical development of truth and reality 
itself. Hegel's philosophy was developed largely as a refutation of Kant's 
deistic supernaturalism.59 It brought into focus a consciousness of the his-
torical development of truth and of the relativity and contingency of history. 
His philosophy of history marked the culmination of the historical move-
ment in the modern world.6() Hegel showed that truth is not something 
which is a finished product existing behind or within the world, but rather 
truth is history, a process. Only at the end of history does the unity and 
wholeness of truth become known.61 His point is that the meaning of each 
event is determined, not by the present or past, but by its future .62 
The shocking thing about Hegel's philosophy was not pantheism. Pan-
nenberg, like many other Hegelian interpreters, believes Hegel affirmed the 
personality of God. Rather, the staggering idea in Hegel was that he defined 
the end of history with his own present situation! Hegel had no open future. 
His eschatology was "radically contemporanized."63 
Pannenberg' s admiration for Hegel lay in his understanding of the his-
torical character of all truth as defined by the future instead of the present or 
past. Pannenberg finds it regrettable that no one since Hegel has posed the 
question of the unity of truth "with a comparable depth."64 Yet modern 
thinking is determined by the consciousness of the historical conditioning of 
all truth-a consciousness which stems from a biblical understanding of 
truth and reality. However, the search for the unity of truth has largely been 
given up by contemporary philosophers since it is apparent that its unity 
could only be seen from the standpoint of the future, and since no one has 
this eschatological perspective, any talk about the unity seems superficial. 
BEYOND THE IMPASSE 
Pannenberg' s theological efforts have been devoted to the development 
of a theology of history which uses Jesus' eschatological message of the fu-
ture of God's reign as a basis for showing how the unity of truth can be af-
firmed and known. He believes the biblical-Christian understanding of truth 
provides the solution to the problem raised by the Greeks concerning the 
unity of truth. Unlike classical theology which defined God's true being ac-
cording to the Greek notion of the timeless present, Pannenberg draws from 
the biblical tradition as the basis for defining God as the power of the 
unbounded future . 
Pannenberg develops the eschatological message of Jesus to show how 
the Greek idea of truth as true being-which is characterized by unity and 
unchangeableness-and the biblical understanding of truth as historical-
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which is characterized by the contingency of events and the openness of the 
future-become one.65 
What has now emerged in recent theological reflection is Pannenberg' s 
new model for perceiving the relation of God and the world. Instead of God 
being "above," or "within" the world, God stands "ahead of" us as the 
power of the unbounded future. God's specific transcendent being and oth-
erness from the world is still affirmed, but His "space" is not above us, or 
within us, but in front of us. He is the attracting, magnetic power of the un-
bounded future who shapes our present. The being of God is not above us as 
an object which we could bypass or overlook; He is not the inner essence of 
all beings as if He were the background within nature. The mode of God's 
being is the unbounded future. The "above" and the "within" model is 
flawed because it pictures God's space as timeless. The "ahead of" model is 
able to do justice both to the specificity of a particular, independent Being 
who is other than this finite world and at the same it is able to picture God's 
space as the unbounded future for whom time is real. 
The idea of history as the sphere of development-along with the 
understanding of the progressive revelation-of God's self in the contin-
gency of events, stands in contradiction to the timelessness of the super-
naturalistic and the pantheistic models. Pannenberg writes: "The idea of the 
future as a mode of God's being is still undeveloped in theology despite the 
intimate connection between God and the coming reign of God in the es-
chatological message of Jesus."66 
Pannenberg has now developed such a model. Pannenberg proposes 
this eschatological worldview as a replacement for supernaturalism. It is not 
an alternative to supernaturalism in the sense that most forms of naturalism 
are attempts to reconstruct Christian theology according to a non-miracu-
lous interpretation which eliminates the activity of a personal God in his-
tory. Rather, Pannenberg's eschatologicalism is an entirely different model 
from the supernatural/natural dichotomy. 
Pannenberg has explained that his "approach to the ontological ques-
tion takes into account the concerns of supernaturalism (in contrast to a self-
sufficient secularist concept of nature), while not yielding to the temptation 
of dualism that is not very well reconcilable to the biblical faith in crea-
tion."67 
Pannenberg thus proposes a new way of thinking about the relation be-
tween God and the world, while maintaining the essential distinction be-
tween an infinite personal Being and the created world. Indeed Pannenberg 
says that any use of the word God which eliminates the idea of a personal 
reality independent from the created world is meaningless.68 
Pantheism dissolves divine personality into a timeless space as an . im-
personal power "within." Supernaturalism elevates God into a space far 
"above" the finite world and depersonalizes the world by alienating human 
beings from their true essence; it suggests that this world is devoid of God 
because God is "above" us. Hence we dwell alone-except as God superim-
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poses Himself from above and enters into relationship with us. Because of 
the unnaturalness of God's presence in the world "below" which this model 
entails, the relationship which He develops with us in this god-forsaken 
world seems forced and unnatural as well. Consequently, the biblical doc-
trine of the divine condescension degenerates into a feeling that God takes a 
condescending attitude toward us, just as the biblical understanding of 
God's transcendence (as the Lord of history) takes on the non-biblical idea 
of a spatial separation of God from us as if He coexists above us. Biblically 
speaking, our aloneness is not due to God's spatial transcendence over us, 
but to the brokenness of our relationship with God as reflected in our dis-
obedience (Genesis 3). It is sin which separates us from a proper relation-
ship to God, not God's cosmologically superior location. 
An eschatological perspective locates God "ahead of" us, leading us to 
our true destiny. Pannenberg writes: "Man participates in God not by flight 
from the world but by active transformation of the world which is the ex-
pression of the divine love, the power of the future over the present by 
which it is transformed in the direction of the glory of God."69 God is really 
present in our world because He relates to us through His Son Jesus whose 
Spirit indwells us. God is not an absentee landlord who has abandoned us. 
Eschatologicalism avoids the schizophrenic split of two worlds to which 
supernaturalism easily succumbed, while at the same time it avoids the flat 
and impersonal (autistic) one-storied world of naturalism. An eschatological 
perspective rejects the idea of different stories or separate realms of being, 
and it further rejects a naturalistic assumption of one static reahn. 
The eschatological model also avoids the charge that human freedom 
cannot be affirmed simultaneously with belief in a personal God, for God is 
not totally present at hand in a timeless reahn. Such a timeless, supramun-
dane Being necessarily excludes the idea of temporal development and 
stands in contradiction to the biblical view of God as the Lord of history. 
The biblical understanding leaves the future open for us as an opportunity 
to participate in the history of God's coming kingdom. Without an open fu-
ture where reality is not yet decided and formed, there can be no freedom. 
But if God is "ahead of" us as the unlimited future, this means time is real 
for God as well as for finite persons. 
The eschatological model also avoids the condescending attitude of the 
monarchical/ supernatural model in which human beings feel the ultimate 
put-down (notice the double meaning of this term) of reality, as if human 
beings are totally depraved and worthless because of their finite humanity. 
It was this perception which led to Nietzsche's ethical refutation of God-
that such a dehumanizing God ought to be killed. Contemporary theologi-
ans, such as Paul Tillich, Thomas Altizer and John Cobb have embraced 
Nietzsche concerning the death of a supernatural/monarchical God.70 Yet 
their alternative to the supernaturalism which they reject is a naturalism 
which obscures God's relation with His creation. 
This atheistic criticism is effectively met in Pannenberg' s eschatological-
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ism with its proposal for a new paradigm concerning God's being which at 
the same time preserves the concerns of supernaturalism. Pannenberg' s 
emphasis is on the trinitarian persons who are presently inviting us to share 
in the fellowship of the coming kingdom of God. God as Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit is actively involved in this temporal process. For this world is 
God's world, not something inherently alien to His true being, and history is 
the field of His action.71 This means God endures the pain of our world and 
through His sufferings we are being reconciled and restored to Himself. 
This is to say, God comes to our situation and gets involved with us in order 
to establish a relationship with us. For it is God's very Self which saves us. 
As Pannenberg puts it, "The salvation that God promises is himself ."72 This 
emphasis that God reveals Himself, not merely useful information about 
Himself, is the significant contribution of Karl Barth to modern/ contempo-
rary theology as Pannenberg has often acknowledged.73 It is knowledge of 
God Himself, of being personally acquainted with God in Jesus through the 
indwelling Spirit, which restores to us our sense of human dignity and feel-
ing of personal worth. 
However, Barth's emphasis on God's Self-disclosure is weakened by the 
notion of a supranatural Being who stands over against this godless world. 
For Barth, this finite, natural world is so different from God that not even 
human language is fit to speak of God's reality. Barth says God has to "com-
mandeer" human speech to say what it is totally unprepared and inade-
quate to say.7' Hence Barth's theology makes excessive use of paradoxical 
language, divorces reason and faith, and labels any type of analogy between 
God and the world as unchristian.75 
The doctrine of the Trinity as formulated in classical theology really 
supports the view that God's being is to be defined in terms of futurity 
rather than in terms of a supramundane Being. For the historical, progres-
sive revelation of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit points us to the fature 
of God who is already enabling us to participate in His coming Kingdom. 
This unbounded future is the place where history will finally become one 
with the essence of God-not pantheistically, but in the sense that God's 
kingdom will be complete. The Book of Revelation described this future 
event as a perfect relationship with God whose immediate presence makes 
everything whole, and God is described in historical terms as "the alpha and 
the omega," "the beginning and the end" (Revelation 20-22). Pannenberg 
thus links the Greek idea of true being, not with "a mere beyond contrasting 
with man's present," but with "the pure futurity of God."76 
In developing his eschatologicalism, Pannenberg is integrating the 
Greek emphasis on truth as a rational understanding of true being with the 
biblical emphasis on truth as a relational understanding of reality as history. 
Unlike the classical Christian tradition which allowed the Greek under-
standing to dominate theological thinking about God's being, Pannenberg 
wants to reassert the priority of the biblical understanding and, more impor-
tantly, Jesus' own teaching as the basis for thinking about God's being. Pan-
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nenberg' s use of the Greek understanding of truth can be seen in the way 
that he seeks rationally to give Jesus' teaching an ontological structure, but 
the substance of that ontological structure is the biblical understanding of 
reality as history. 
AN ESCHATOL(X;ICAL DOCTRINE OF CREATION 
Pannenberg' s eschatological ontology is exegetically based in Jesus' 
message on the imminent Kingdom of God. He takes seriously the well-
known tension between the "already" and "not yet" aspects of the Kingdom 
of God. Pannenberg sees this tension to mean both future and present are 
"inextricably interwoven." 77 God's Kingdom is not merely some future cos-
mic event while human beings simply wait and endure for its arrival. 
Rather, the present is pregnant with meaning because God, who is the 
power of the future, extends His rule in the present. This means the present 
is the effect of the future. God, as the power of the future, has acted deci-
sively in His Son whose message, life and destiny have eschatological sig-
nificance for all people. 
This presupposition of the coming Kingdom for theological reflection 
holds in utter seriousness the cosmic and historical implications of Jesus' es-
chatological message. This eschatological future cannot be simply narrowed 
down existentially to mean that one should appropriate the possibilities of 
human existence, as Bultmann does. Nor must it be reduced to the idea of a 
mere ethical attainment on the part of human beings as though they could 
bring about the Kingdom of God on earth by the means of their own initia-
tive, as classical liberal theology maintained.78 Jesus' teaching on the immi-
nent kingdom of God means "this future is expected to come in a marvelous 
way from God himself; it is not simply the development of human history 
or the achievement of God-fearing men," Pannenberg insists.79 
Furthermore, the uniqueness of Jesus' eschatological message consisted 
not in His mere preaching concerning the coming of God's Kingdom on 
earth, but rather that the presence of this coming Kingdom was now already 
happening in His person, thus showing that the present is to be seen in the 
light of the future and that Jesus Himself as God's Son is the pre-actualiza-
tion of the future . 
This brings us to Pannenberg' s idea of an eschatological doctrine of 
creation.80 The ontological implication of Jesus' eschatological message sug-
gests a reversal in the traditional understanding of the time sequence. Crea-
tion does not simply stand at the opposite pole of eschatology within the 
time spectrum. Rather, theology should speak of a "creative eschaton," 81 
thereby showing that the temporal beginnings of the history of the world 
eventuate from the future and that God as the power of the future is crea-
tively directing the course of history toward the ultimate inauguration of 
His Kingdom. 
This means creation should not be seen from the perspective of a mere 
primordial beginning. Both creation and eschatology are "partners in the 
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formation of reality."82 This means the future provides the basis for inter-
preting the meaning of every event in the present. "At present a being is 
'something,' a unity in itself, only by anticipation of its unifying future. The 
future interprets the present and the past; all other interpretations are help-
ful only to the degree that they anticipate the future." 83 
This eschatological understanding is the "resounding motif of Jesus' 
message."" To speak of the Kingdom of God is to speak of the rule of God. To 
speak of the rule of God is to speak of the being of God, since His rule cannot 
be thought of apart from His existence. To speak of the being of God in con-
nection with the rule of God is to speak of the power of God, for it is through 
the power of His being that He rules. And, since Jesus' eschatological mes-
sage proclaimed both the "already" and the "not yet" aspects of the King-
dom of God, it can be said "in a restricted but important sense, God does 
not yet exist. Since his rule and his being are inseparable, God's being is still 
in the process of corning to be."85 In this way, Pannenberg is showing that 
the oneness of God's being is linked primarily with the corning Kingdom of 
God in history, while the three persons of the Trinity are the concrete reali-
ties of the one God (as opposed to the abstract oneness of God). History is in 
process of moving toward its goal in the being of God (that is, we will be in-
corporated into the life and being of God), but of course we will not become 
pantheistically one with the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. In this way, Pan-
nenberg points out that it is in the eschaton that God's rule shall be univer-
sally established at which time it can be said that the goal of history will be 
attained, thus showing the end of history will be one with the essence of 
God. 
To speak of the eschatological future of the kingdom of God is not to 
eliminate the reality of God's presence and rule in the present. Present es-
chatological existence is available to human beings because the eschatologi-
cal future has proleptically occurred in Jesus of Nazareth, whose redemp-
tive life effected our reconciliation with God. Or, to put it otherwise, salva-
tion is available to us today because the future of God's Kingdom in which 
God reigns supremely and universally has been unveiled in Jesus' eschato-
logical message and person, and those who accept His message of forgive-
ness also accept Hirn. It is through His cross and resurrection that Jesus' 
person and message are seen to be interrelated. Thus, those who believe in 
Jesus already participate in the corning Kingdom of God.86 
To speak of the corning Kingdom of God is not to degrade the past. For 
God as the power of the future rules the past as well as the present. This 
means to speak of God as the power of the future is to speak of His eternity. 
To be sure, eternity is not a timeless reality. It is not the unchanging, primor-
dial and eternal present of Platonic philosophy. Neither is God "the concept 
of a timeless ground of being in the depths of reality, in the background of 
the realm of being."87 Rather, time is implicit in the very essence of God.88 
This means that only in the actualization of the future-i.e., in the eschaton 
when God's Kingdom shall become a concrete and universal reality-will 
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history be one with the essence of God. Only then will God's self revelation 
be direct, for both His will and purpose will be communicated in an unbro-
ken and direct manner. In philosophical terms, this means subject and object 
will be identical, that what-is will be fully revealed in what-appears, that the 
one who communicates and what is communicated will be identical. 
In contrast to Whitehead, who posits the idea of a development in God 
because of His involvement in time, Pannenberg sees the futurity of God's 
Kingdom to mean that what truth is in the present will be decided from the 
standpoint of the future. But this does not mean that God undergoes a de-
velopment in His essence. Rather, when the goal of history has been accom-
plished, it will be seen that what is true then was true throughout the move-
ment of time.89 
Pannenberg is not suggesting that God merely relates Himself to finite 
human beings as the power of the future, but that God is in Himself the 
power of the future. This means God is pure freedom.90 However, without 
the concept of the future there can be no concept of freedom or personhood. 
In this respect, only if human beings have a future do they have freedom. 
Openness to the future is a fundamental feature of freedom and individual-
ity. This means we are free to the extent that we can transcend ourselves 
and thus transform and go beyond the present. In contrast to us, God is 
pure freedom because there is no future beyond Him. He is the unbounded 
future. 
This idea of the personality and freedom of God is distinguished from 
Paul Tillich's belief that God is not a being or a person but Being itself, the 
Ground of Being and "the ground of everything personal."91 However, Pan-
nenberg points out that unless God is thought of as an independent Being 
with personality, the concept of God is meaningless.92 Pannenberg shows 
that God is the power of Being because He is the power of the future and 
thus pure freedom. "Being is itself to be thought of from the side of the fu-
ture, instead of as the abstract, most universal something in the background 
of all beings."93 Since God (as Being) is the power of the future, this suggests 
His eternity. 
In this respect, Pannenberg calls for a revision of the Greek idea of eter-
nity (as the eternal present) . Since God exists as the final future, then the 
idea of eternity may be defined as "the totally comprehensive present."94 In 
this way, the concept of eternity includes the element of change and time in-
stead of static permanence and timelessness. 
From our finite perspective it can be said that "the eschaton is eternity in 
the fullest sense."95 Eternity refers to the existence (or Being) of God. And 
since in the eschaton it is the essence of God to exist, the past, present and 
future are merged into one. This means the eschaton is the arrival of the 
Kingdom of God. To be sure, God's existence has been from eternity and He 
has always remained the same because in His pure freedom He exists as the 
final future. But for finite man, God's essence does not yet fully exist. It is 
only in the eschaton that God's essence will be directly seen to exist. 
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By emphasizing the futurity of the Kingdom of God which will disclose 
the essence of God, it should be reiterated that this does not devalue the 
present. Nor does it adopt any form of theological agnosticism. To be sure, 
our knowledge of God's revelation can be ascertained historically as it is re-
ported in the biblical tradition, and thus our relationship to God through Je-
sus of Nazareth is no pious self-delusion. But, our objective knowledge (in-
sight) of God's self-revelation is only indirect and partial, and can only be 
direct and complete in the eschaton. On the other hand, our experience of 
God through faith in Jesus is direct and immediate, for fellowship with Je-
sus "really mediates and assures salvation," Pannenberg writes.96 
He further writes: "He who believes in Jesus has salvation in Jesus 
whom he trusts, without regard to the question how it stands with his his-
torical and theological knowledge of Jesus," though of course one must at 
least presuppose the message of Jesus is true.97 
The distinction between God's indirect and direct self-revelation (or 
stated otherwise, the distinction between the "already" and the "not yet" of 
the kingdom of God) can be further illustrated in the philosophical distinc-
tion of appearance and reality. The unity and difference between appear-
ance and reality has been a subject of considerable debate in the history of 
philosophy. Without developing all the problems and issues connected with 
this debate in this article, it is evident that Pannenberg' s epistemology is a 
realism (as opposed to idealism and positivism) because he defines appear-
ance as a truthful disclosure of what is real. What-appears is what-is, 
though at the same time it must be said that what-is is not exhausted in 
what-appears. Reality appears in more than one event, and yet reality is 
more than its appearances. This does not suggest that appearance is mere 
semblance. Rather, what-is really appears. Pannenberg writes: "Connected 
with the possibility of manifold appearance of one and the same eidos is the 
fact that it exhausts itself in none of its appearances. There always remain 
other ways in which 'the same' eidos could appear."98 
Insofar as the kingdom of God is concerned, it has already appeared in 
the ministry of Jesus. In His person, the coming Kingdom of God has al-
ready commenced in the world, though at the same time the present appear-
ance of the reality of the Kingdom of God does not exhaust its futurity. This 
is to say, the reality of the kingdom of God has already made its appearance, 
even though this appearance is to be differentiated from its reality. Only in 
the eschaton will the reality of the kingdom of God be identical with its ap-
pearance. 
This distinction between the present appearance and the future reality of 
the Kingdom of God corresponds to the distinction between God as Father 
and Jesus as Son. That the Kingdom of God has appeared means that the 
reign of God was begun on earth in the person of Jesus. This means "that 
God himself had uniquely and definitely appeared in Jesus without the dif-
ference between Jesus and God himself being thereby dissolved."99 Thus, 
the arrival of the future reality of the Kingdom of God in the present means 
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that God joined Himself to the finite by making His appearance in Jesus, 
though without restricting the reality of Himself to His appearance in Jesus. 
Pannenberg writes: "The distinctive characteristic of the message of Jesus is 
that the future of the rule of God is not separated from the present as still 
outstanding, but that precisely as the future it becomes the power that deter-
mines the present and thus comes to appearance in the present."100 Stated 
philosophically, this means appearance is the partial arrival of the future. 100 
It is this combined unity and difference in appearance and reality that 
places the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation at variance with the ancient 
oriental religions in which any certain form of the deity's appearance was 
inconsequential because its appearance constituted no essential unity with 
the god. Because of this separation of appearance and reality, the mythical 
god could "appear" in as many forms as it wished, for its appearance was 
nonessential to its being. Likewise, in Platonic philosophy appearance was 
nonessential to true being. Such is not the case with the idea of the Incarna-
tion. The appearance of God in Jesus of Nazareth means His essential unity 
with God, thus suggesting that appearance and essential presence coincide. 
This inseparable interaction between appearance and reality illustrates the 
doctrine of the Incarnation in which there is the inseparable connection be-
tween Jesus as the appearance of God and the reality of God.102 
Thus, the significance of the appearance of God in Jesus is that His ap-
pearance is an enduring present appearance because it is the essential pres-
ence of the unlimited future. Theologically stated, the reality of God as the 
unbounded future has appeared in Jesus of Nazareth, and this appearance is 
a permanent and enduring present because it is the appearance of the ultimate 
reality of the future (i.e., God). 
The obvious implication of such an "enduring present" is that in Jesus 
of Nazareth we have the finality of God's revelation so long as history is still 
hastening toward the eschaton. This is to say, if the reality of God has ap-
peared in Jesus, then He is the anticipation of the ultimate future which is 
God. And, if the appearance of Jesus is the arrival of what is the ultimate 
future, then no other event can surpass the Christ-event without involving 
itself in a logical contradiction. To be sure, God continues to work in history, 
but He does not reveal Himself in any fundamentally new manner (i.e., if 
the appearance of Jesus is really the arrival of God as the power of the fu-
ture).103 
Pannenberg thus offers an ontological perspective which (1) identifies 
reality with the comprehensive .whole of history rather than with the un-
changing, primordial, eternal present of Platonic philosophy; (2) interprets 
the transcendence of God eschatologically rather than supernaturally; and 
(3) understands the being of God socially rather than monarchically. 
ANSWERING OBJECTIONS 
Pannenberg, in responding to some of his critics, shows that to affirm 
"that reality is history hastening toward an End" does not mean that history is 
' 
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merely the external exhibition of a logically fixed Idea (as in Hegel), for this 
in effect would reduce history to the nonessential insofar as anything really 
new occurring.104 Rather, history as it moves toward its goal in the eschaton 
in fact undergoes further development which includes modifications and 
transformations of present reality.105 Despite this contingency and inconclu-
siveness of history, to think in terms of the whole of reality is an inescapable 
fact of life, even though it is usually done unreflectively.106 
Pannenberg does not assert, however, that one can attain absolute 
knowledge as though he would be able, on the basis of present experience, 
to comprehend the whole of history.107 But he does argue that the whole of 
reality can be historically mediated provisionally and proleptically on the 
basis of God's activity in the world. 
Pannenberg acknowledges his indebtedness to Hegel's insights concern-
ing the idea of a universal history, but he denies that he is a Hegelian be-
cause Hegel failed to appreciate the biblical understanding of an open fu-
ture which has been provisionally and proleptically revealed in the history 
of Jesus. He further insists that the origin of the idea of universal history is 
in the biblical tradition itself.108 
In asserting that it is history as the whole of reality that reveals the es-
sence of God, Pannenberg does not intend to suggest that the infinite is re-
duced to the finite or that God is identical with the process of history itself. 
But neither is God to be thought of as a timeless, static Being. Rather, He is 
creatively active in the process of history. He is the power of the future who 
works in the present in order to usher in His Kingdom. This is not to local-
ize the infinite in the finite. Neither is it to adopt "an exclusive immanence" 
(which is itself a contradiction in terms)109 as opposed to a transcendency. 
Pannenberg explains that "history is not the field of a finitude which is en-
closed within itself, an 'immanence' to which one could and indeed would 
have to oppose a 'transcendence.'" Instead, Pannenberg shows that history 
is "the ongoing collapse of the existing reality which is enclosed in its own 
'immanence' (because centered on itself). The power of the infinite is active 
and present in this collapse of the finite." 110 Thus, history is not merely the 
sum total of what human beings have done and suffered. Neither is history 
merely the creation of human beings. What human beings are and what 
they create is finite, but history in this sense is not finite. "Rather, it accom-
plishes the crisis of the finite throughout time. Hence man shows himself to 
be finite in his history."111 
Pannenberg further points out that history is not itself self-explanatory 
apart from the transcendent reality of God who chooses to make Himself 
known in history. If history were thought of as being "wholly other" from 
the reality of God, then there would be no purpose in speaking of God, if 
history in this respect · were complete and comprehensible without Him. 
"Only because the infinite reality, which as personal can be called God, is 
present and active in the history of the finite, can one speak of a revelation 
of God in history. For it is thereby concretely shown that the finite is not left 
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to itself ."112 
nus is not to say that history reveals God as an inference, as though this 
would constitute a cosmological proof for the existence of God correspond-
ing to the Greek idea of a timeless cosmos from which one infers the exis-
tence of one God. Rather, God is "immediately perceptible to men" because 
He makes Himself known, and thus this knowledge "is not first discovered 
upon reflection by means of an inference."113 
SOME FINAL PERSONAL COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
Most Evangelicals have appreciated Pannenberg' s theology of Jesus' 
resurrection, but they have also been skeptical of his historical/ critical 
methodology because of its apparent anti-supernaturalism. Daniel Fuller 
was one of the earliest American Evangelicals to embrace Pannenberg' s the-
ology, but he disagreed with its non-supernatural worldview.114 
What Fuller and others fail to appreciate is that Pannenberg is not an 
anti-supernaturalist in the sense which many theologians are (like Paul Til-
lich), but rather he wants to preserve the essential truth of supernaturalism 
with its emphasis on God's transcendence and divine otherness. Further, 
Pannenberg' s replacement of supernaturalism with eschatologicalism is not 
linked to any hesitancy to embrace miracles. Rather, he objects to the idea 
that miracles are interruptions from above. In this respect, Pannenberg is 
closer to Augustine's view of miracles than Aquinas's. Augustine inter-
preted miracles as a normal result of God's presence in creation as opposed 
to Aquinas who saw miracles as superimposed on the created, natural order 
from above.115 For Pannenberg every event is a miracle because of God's per-
sonal and intimate involvement with His creation. Pannenberg will not al-
low for a supernatural/ natural dichotomy. 
Some Evangelical theologians in America describe themselves as Prot-
estant in their theology, but Thomistic in their metaphysic.116 Some find little 
in Thomistic theology or Thomistic metaphysics which they like,117 but con-
tinue to use the supernatural/natural categories of Thomism. In fact, almost 
no one in conservative, Evangelical circles would question the validity of 
supernaturalism-a situation for which they really have Thomas Aquinas 
largely to thank. 
I find myself thankful for the clarifying function of the supernatural 
model, especially during my own seminary student days. With no alternate 
model available which could help put the biblical doctrines into a meta-
physical framework, supernaturalism has been a most important intellectual 
tool for enabling me to appreciate the mystery and reality of a transcendent, 
self-sustaining God who created the world ex nihilo. And I have found 
supernaturalism helpful as a teaching aid for enabling my students to grasp 
the difference between a biblical understanding of God and the various sub-
biblical views which obscure God's difference from creation. It also pro-
vided for a more sophisticated way of interpreting the figurative language 
in the Bible of a three-storied universe of heaven above us with God in the 
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"highest heaven" (2 Chron 6:18) and hell beneath us. 
Yet my students repeatedly found it difficult to understand how we 
could speak of God's revelation if He is really separated from the world in 
another world above us. To qualify God's "aboveness" as not really mean-
ing that He was entirely above us leaves unanswered the question of what is 
meant by the difference between God and the world. To appeal to the 
analogical nature of religious language (of Thomism) as a basis for explain-
ing the relationship was to admit we should not seek for an answer, but just 
take it on faith! Of course God is ultimately mystery and incomprehensible, 
and our explicit knowledge of His reality is limited. (That is why in worship 
our language becomes doxological!) So our tacit knowledge of God exceeds 
our explicit knowledge. But the supernatural model obscures our under-
standing of how God can be known as a real presence in our world, if He 
dwells cosmologically above us. 
Instead of a Thomistic doctrine of analogical language, Pannenberg be-
lieves that Michael Polanyi' s distinction between tacit and explicit knowl-
edge, along with his emphasis on the personal/ religious nature of human 
language in general, is a more fruitful way of explaining the nature of theo-
logical language.118 This avoids the logical difficulty associated with the doc-
trine of the analogy of being-that our words are forced to speak of two 
separate realms at the same time. Analogical language is vulnerable to the 
charge that its speech is equivocal and artificial, whereas Polanyi' s analysis 
of the tacit dimension suggests a model which maintains that human words 
are inherently religious ("user friendly") and readily facilitate an under-
standing of spiritual realities. The theological task of developing a more ex-
plicit understanding of our tacit knowledge of God does not require an arti-
ficial linkage between the supernatural and the natural. Human speech is 
first and foremost religious in its essence and can be further refined by phi-
losophers and theologians to accommodate a more precise and explicit un-
derstanding of the religious dimension. On the other hand, a Thomistic con-
cept of analogical language, with its assumption that human words must be 
lifted beyond their natural meanings and given a supernatural denotation, 
resulted in the secularistic rationalization of language-as if words are in-
herently secular. Pannenberg' s early research into the history of religious 
language convinced him of the essentially religious nature of human 
speech.119 
I must express my appreciation for the Thomistic doctrine of analogical 
language. It has been a helpful model for my students to avoid fundarnen-
talistic literalism. I have used it along with Polanyi' s tacit/ explicit model of 
knowing. Only recently has it occurred to me that the two models are in-
compatible because they assume different ontological models. 
The reason for the virtual demise of classical orthodox teaching in major 
centers of learning today is often attributed to the rationalistic presupposi-
tions of Enlightenment thinking, but it can be argued that the apparent logi-
cal contradiction of supernaturalism-which both its and oppo-
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nents have defended and assailed-may in part be the real culprit. Father 
Henri De Lubac even admits that secularism is a consequence of the dualis-
tic tendency of supernaturalism itself.120 
As a creative response to Kant's rationalism, Schleiermacher, the father 
of modem theology, has been blamed for charting the future course of the-
ology down the road of self-destruction,121 but clearly he was seeking to find 
a way of interpreting the doctrines of Christian faith which did not succumb 
to the inherent logical conundrums of supematuralism.122 His reformulation 
of Christian doctrine seriously wounded orthodoxy, and it has never recov-
ered. Perhaps if Schleiermacher had worked from a different model than his 
"pantheistic" one, and if he had focused his attention on the need to revise 
an ontological model which was more in accord with the biblical under-
standing of God, then the subsequent course of modem and contemporary 
theology might have been quite different. 
Is it right for us to blame the rationalistic presuppositions of Kant and 
Enlightenment thought in general for the demise of orthodoxy? To be sure, 
theology since Kant cannot be understood except as an attempt to come to 
terms with his bifurcated metaphysic which polarized the relations of God 
and the world. But perhaps the blame for the demise of orthodox Christian 
doctrines may be more directly related to the supernaturalism in which 
orthodoxy was enmeshed and less to the actual assaults of Enlightenment ra-
tionalism. Kant was only attempting to work out more consistently the 
philosophical implications of his own pietistic/ orthodox training, and in the 
process of doing so he sought to replace the logical incoherence of orthodox 
supernaturalism itself with his deistic supernaturalism. 
Unfortunately, the orthodox doctrines of classical Christianity and the 
supernaturalism which eventually came to surround those doctrines have 
not been sufficiently distinguished with the consequence that orthodox doc-
trines have often been thrown out along with supernaturalism. What has 
thus emerged, as a result of confusing a supematuralistic ontology as the 
necessary presupposition for understanding the major doctrines of the 
Christian faith, have been largely ineffective or unduly complex rehabilita-
tions of supernaturalism, or various forms of so-called Christian naturalism 
which eliminate the essential doctrines which make Christianity truly Chris-
tian. 
The final implication of supernaturalism may well itself be secularistic 
naturalism which denies the spiritual dimension altogether. And so long as 
supernaturalism is still the inherent intellectual framework of Christian doc-
trines, the secularistic and atheistic critique of Christian faith will continue 
to hold. 
But the collapse of supernaturalism into secularistic naturalism may not 
prove itself to be the final word. While the secular critique of supernatural-
ism has validity, secular naturalism may inevitably collapse under the 
weight of its own critique of supernaturalism. For secular naturalism may 
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be able to survive only in reference to the supernaturalism which it cri-
tiques. 
Paul Tillich points out that modem atheism is not paganism; rather, it is 
"anti-Christian in Christian terms."123 In this respect, modem atheism is re-
ally a Christian heresy. 
Perhaps the next step beyond secularistic naturalism (if supernaturalism 
were wiped out) is a revitalized paganism? For the humanistic values which 
secular naturalism wants to preserve cannot be intellectually substantiated 
on the same grounds that it says belief in God cannot be accepted-namely, 
such secularistic values are a mere illusion based on mere psychological 
need. 
The point here is that perhaps supernaturalism may not be an essential 
component of the orthodox doctrines of Christian faith. In fact, it may be an 
artificial imposition which Christian faith should dispense with. Perhaps the 
critique of supernaturalism by secularistic naturalism has performed a use-
ful service for Christian faith by exposing the logical-theological incoher-
ence of a bifurcated worldview. 
There may be some truth then to the Death-of-God theology of the 
1960s, as well as process theology which has praised Nietzsche for his bold 
declaration that the God of supematuralistic theism is dead. Nietzsche's in-
sight was his perception that a personal God who is so totally other from the 
world cannot be taken seriously by human beings whose daily concerns are 
related to personal survival and existential meaning. Such interference by an 
alien authority only stifles human happiness and leads to a negation of the 
importance of this world. In defense of human dignity and worth, Nietzsche 
opposed an unethical concept of a tyrannical God who arbitrarily superim-
posed His will on frail human beings dominated by fear and guilt. 
Of course, supernaturalism did not intend to imply such a truncated 
and bifurcated view of God and the world. Yet, inadvertently, it did lead 
(perhaps inevitably) to such-an extreme dualism. The doctrine of the Trinity 
with its emphasis on the temporal development of a historical revelation of 
God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit who are intimately involved in a loving 
and redeeming way in the affairs of this world stands in contradiction to a 
supematuralistic distancing of God from the world. -
What creates spiritual distance from God? Is it God's spatial transcen-
dence above us in another, alien world? Is this natural world to be despised 
and downgraded because it is totally depraved and devoid of any inherent 
goodness? Is it God's spatial distance from us that defines His holiness and 
our sinfulness? This misconception of God's relation to the world, which 
supernaturalism fosters in spite of itself, is what causes Schubert Ogden to 
say that "supematuralism. . .is in principle an inconsistent and self-stultifying 
position."124 
It is significant that the concept of a supernatural distancing of God 
from the world emerged in the feudalistic society of the Middle Ages where 
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landowners (lords) lived in isolated and well-protected castles, separated 
from the rest of the human community. In contrast to the self-serving, tyran-
nical power of a feudal lord is the shepherding concept of the Lord in the 
Old Testament (Ps 23:1). Also, the Medieval development of a supernatural 
ontology which implies tyrannical loftiness over the world is essentially 
contradictory to its own theology of the God of history whose lordship en-
tails friendship with His subjects ("I will dwell among the people of Israel, 
and will be their God," Exod 29:45). The biblical imagery of God being high 
and lifted up (Isa 6:12) expresses God's moral, qualitative difference from 
sinful humanity, rather than a literal, spatial separation of God above the 
natural world. The history of salvation was the overcoming of this distance 
in Jesus of Nazareth. 
The spatial imagery in Scripture is largely relational in meaning. For ex-
ample, Jesus' ascension to His Father is a figure of speech to indicate that 
Jesus would take up a new relationship with His people through the Pente-
costal outpouring of His Holy Spirit. The interpretation of Jesus' ascension 
which implies that God resides above or outside the natural universe in a 
supernatural realm contradicts the relational intent of the biblical spatial im-
agery. The essential meaning of the ascension is not God's removal of Him-
self from us, but rather that a deeper and closer relationship to God is now 
possible because He dwells "within" His people ijohn 14:17, Acts 1 and 2). 
The spatial imagery of the "descent" of the Holy Spirit is a corollary to the 
imagery of Jesus' "ascent" to heaven. Of course, this spatial imagery implies 
divine transcendence, but a supernatural ontology is not the only way to 
interpret it. 
This concept of God dwelling "within" us through the giving of His 
Spirit to the Church is, of course, not a pantheistic mysticism, for God is 
other than the world. He transcends us as the power of the unbounded fu-
ture, but He is immanent because He, as the Future, determines the present 
course of history. He is infinite; we are finite. We are not distant from God 
because He is too lofty for us and has to separate Himself from us on a 
higher plane. Rather, what creates spiritual distance from God whose pres-
ence (space) no one can escape (not even in hell, Ps 139:8) is our sinfulness 
and rebellion against the only possible Source of our being and meaningful-
ness. It is spiritual distance, not spatial distance, which creates fear and 
makes us sinners. 
That we "feel" distance from God proves that our problem with es-
trangement from God is a spiritual separation, not a spatial absence of God. 
If God's absence was spatial, we would not feel it as such. We would simply 
be ignorant of His reality. This is the problem with Barth's supernaturalism: 
that the natural world is so spatially empty of God that any religious feeling 
is tinged with human arrogance and is the product of an anthropocentric at-
tempt to create God in our own image.125 Hence Barth's capitulation to 
Feuerbach! 
To be sure, God in His triune being is ontologically different from hu-
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mans. God alone is self-existent. This is the insight which supernaturalism 
rightly seeks to capture, but as a model of what is true being, supernatural-
ism fosters an inherent, self-deprecating attitude as if we are unworthy hu-
mans because we are spatially isolated from God in a lower level of 
(un)reality. 
During my doctoral studies, Wolfhart Pannenberg was just beginning to 
make headlines as a young, contemporary theologian who defied labels and 
who was calling for a new way of doing theology which would provide for 
a better understanding of the significance of the God of Jesus. I particularly 
was impressed with his historical defense of the resurrection of Jesus of 
Nazareth. Most Evangelicals have welcomed his closely reasoned and bril-
liant argument for the empty tomb and the reality of the appearances of the 
risen Lord.126 
I was also particularly impressed with his eschatological worldview, 
though I was not sure what to think about his apparent anti-supernatural-
ism. It was clear that he believed in the distinctly personal character of a 
transcendent God and he affirmed the reality of the miracle of the Resurrec-
tion. I was aware that his remarks against supernaturalism were mostly di-
rected against its two-story approach which pitted each against the other. 
And I concurred with his rejection of that particular form of supernatural-
ism. 
So I found myself using both a Thomistic model of supernaturalism and 
Pannenberg' s eschatological ontology as if they could both be incorporated 
as supplementary views. What suddenly dawned on me (following Pannen-
berg' s visit to our Asbury Theological Seminary campus) is that the two 
views are mutually exclusive, even though Pannenberg' s interpretation of 
Christian doctrines are indeed largely, though not completely, compatible 
with classical orthodoxy. My growing conviction is that all the major doc-
trines of traditional Christianity (including the doctrines of biblical inspira-
tion and the Virgin Birth, in contrast to Pannenberg' s own views on these 
doctrines) are best understood from an eschatological perspective rather 
than a supernaturalist one. 
To understand the implications of Pannenberg' s bold, provocative, crea-
tive and apparently biblically based model of reality will require much more 
time and careful attention by Evangelicals. For now, we can be grateful for 
his considerable theological contribution. Process theologian John Cobb has 
said: "It is doubtful that there is another thinker alive today who is as com-
prehensive in the command of wide-ranging disciplines as Wolfhart Pan-
nenberg." Cobb thinks Whitehead was the greatest philosopher who ever 
lived, and "on the process side, only Whitehead himself can compare with 
Pannenberg." Cobb further comments: "The single most sustained and thor-
oughgoing embodiment of this theological response to the decay of moder-
nity is that of Pannenberg. Pannenberg has rethought the relation of Christi-
anity and the Enlightenment profoundly and brilliantly."127 
We can look ahead (to use a good Pannenbergian concept!) to his sys-
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tematic theology which is just now being translated into English. 128 My per-
sonal expectation is that his eschatological model as a paradigm shift from 
supernaturalism may well serve as a new beginning for theology (not unlike 
the new beginning which Schleiermacher' s liberal theology initiated). If so, 
then we can expect a resurgence of the importance of systematic theology 
which has been slighted by neglect or disdained by our pietistic traditions 
both among those who are conservative and liberal. 
More importantly, this new model for understanding the reality of God 
is an opportunity for Evangelicals in particular to seize the theological mo-
mentum and take the leading role in shaping the way the Church thinks and 
believes. Evangelicals now have had developed for them a more appropri-
ate onto-theological framework in which the orthodox beliefs can best be 
understood. The time has come to get off the see-saw of supernaturalism/ 
naturalism and affirm with theological and biblical integrity the coming 
kingdom of God! Instead of a defensive posture of attacking our past ene-
mies who have compromised the faith, we have before us a challenge to re-
think our theology in ways which may prove to be more intellectually com-
pelling and spiritually renewing. 
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